The White House released its National Security Strategy on December 4, 2025, positioning India as a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific, with emphasis on defence, technology, and Quad cooperation. The Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the document on December 8, noting it reflects the “comprehensive global strategic partnership” between the two nations. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal highlighted deepened collaboration in AI, quantum computing, and counter-terrorism, aligning with recent joint working group meetings. This recognition is accurate and substantive: the NSS explicitly commits to stronger commercial ties and Indo-Pacific security through the Quad, acknowledging India’s role in countering regional challenges without naming adversaries directly.
Yet, last week’s trifecta of developments complicates the picture. The US approved a $686 million package for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet on December 8, including Link-16 systems and avionics upgrades, justified as supporting counterterrorism interoperability. While the DSCA insists it won’t alter regional balance, the timing—months after India’s May skirmish with Pakistan—raises eyebrows in New Delhi, where F-16s remain a sensitive symbol of past U.S. tilt. Concurrently, the launch of Pax Silica, a nine-nation silicon supply chain pact to counter Chinese dominance, excluded India despite including Quad allies Japan and Australia. Congress leader Jairam Ramesh called this omission unsurprising given strained Trump-Modi ties since May, though no official Indian response has critiqued it yet.
These moves reveal Washington’s transactional realism under Trump. The NSS’s praise for India serves strategic ends—bolstering a counterweight in Asia—while F-16 support sustains Pakistan’s utility in Afghanistan’s aftermath and regional contingencies. Pax Silica’s exclusion, per reports, reflects concerns over India’s tech ecosystem maturity or alignment priorities, prioritizing tighter circles like Israel and UAE for critical minerals and AI infrastructure. For India, the NSS affirmation is welcome, but the other signals underscore the limits of partnership: America’s interests remain fluid, balancing rivals even as it courts New Delhi.
India should view this trifecta pragmatically, not emotionally. The NSS endorsement validates Modi’s Quad investments and iCET tech dialogue, opening doors for deeper defence co-production. Yet, F-16 upgrades demand quiet vigilance—perhaps accelerating indigenous AMCA fighters—while Pax Silica’s snub highlights the need for self-reliance in semiconductors via the India Semiconductor Mission. New Delhi’s nonalignment has served well: abstaining on Ukraine while securing Russian oil discounts. The challenge is sustaining this agility when partners like the US pursue selective coalitions.
Trump’s “America First” lens treats alliances as deals, not destinies. India’s response must match that clarity: leverage NSS goodwill for tech transfers, hedge with Russia and Europe, and invest in domestic capabilities to reduce external dependencies.
